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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

NOTE

A NEW STANDARD OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY EMERGES:
KOLSTAD V. AMERICAN DENTAL ASS’N ADDRESSES VICARIOUS
LIABILITY IN PUNITIVE DAMAGES

I.

INTRODUCTION

The incidents that give rise to punitive damages claims for violations of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 (Title VII) and Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act2 (ADA) are certainly not as uncommon as
most employers would feel comfortable believing. Following the Supreme
Court’s June 1999 decision in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n,3 which aimed
to clarify the standard for awarding punitive damages under these
nondiscrimination statutes, the lower courts immediately began assessing large
punitive damages awards against employers.4 For example, within two months
of the Kolstad decision, two different circuit courts ordered Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. to pay punitive damages for the discriminatory acts of its supervisory
agents. In Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Fifth Circuit
affirmed judgment for a white female who was terminated from her job after
she married a black sales associate.5 Similarly, in EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., the Tenth Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of a hearing-impaired
employee who was first demoted and later terminated when he demanded an
interpreter for a job-training seminar.6

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12112–12117 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
527 U.S. 526 (1999).
See discussion of the cases applying Kolstad decision infra Part IV.D.
188 F.3d 278, 280 (5th Cir. 1999); see discussion infra Part IV.D.3.
187 F.3d 1241, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 1999); see discussion infra Part IV.D.2.
1561
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It was pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the 1991 Act) that
monetary damages became available for certain classes of violations of both
Title VII and the ADA.7 The 1991 Act limits these monetary remedies to cases
of “intentional discrimination.”8 In addition, the 1991 Act further conditions
the availability of punitive damages on proof that the respondent (employer)
has engaged in “a discriminatory practice . . . with malice or with reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.”9
During the past decade, the various circuit courts developed divergent views
with regard to the burden of proof this language imposed on plaintiffs who
sought jury instructions on punitive damages.10
In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to clarify “the circumstances under which a jury may
consider a request for punitive damages.”11 At the heart of the case was
whether a petitioner had to demonstrate that the employer had acted
“egregiously” or “outrageously.”12 In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court
rejected the idea that punitive damages could only be imposed if the
employer’s conduct was “egregious” or “outrageous.”13 Rather, the Court held
“an employer must at least discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its
actions will violate federal law.”14
After clarifying the punitive damages standard, five of the nine Justices
took the case one controversial step further.15 This slim majority went beyond
the question presented and set forth a standard for holding employers
vicariously liable in punitive damages for the acts of their managerial agents.16
The majority formulated its standard by modifying principles in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency. The new rule provides, “[I]n the punitive
damages context, an employer may not be vicariously liable for the
discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where these
decisions are contrary to the employer’s ‘good-faith efforts to comply with
Title VII.’”17
Part II of this Note presents an overview of employer liability under Title
VII. Part III discusses the standard for imposing liability on employers for

7. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
8. Id. § 1981a(a)(1)-(2).
9. Id. § 1981a(b)(1).
10. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1244 & n.6 (10th Cir. 1999)
(identifying the circuit split).
11. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 533; see discussion infra Part IV.C.
12. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 534.
13. Id. at 534-35.
14. Id. at 536.
15. Id. at 539-46.
16. Id. at 545.
17. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545 (citing en banc dissent of Circuit Judge Tatel).
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sexual harassment perpetrated by a supervisor against a subordinate employee.
This standard was developed in Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson,18
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,19 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.20
Part IV addresses the Supreme Court’s most recent discussion of employer
liability in the punitive damages context. It examines: (1) the history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991; (2) the divergent standards that emerged from the
federal courts as they tried to apply the 1991 Act; (3) the 1999 Kolstad
decision; and (4) cases arising under Title VII and the ADA that have
attempted to apply the Kolstad decision.
Part V presents the author’s analysis. This Part criticizes the majority’s
decision to set forth a new standard for imputing liability to employers because
this issue was not relevant to the facts of the case. Kolstad involved
discrimination by the two top-ranking officers of the American Dental
Association. Such high-echelon officers have generally been considered
“proxies” or “alter egos” of the employer, and thus, a consideration of whether
liability should be imputed to the employer was unnecessary. This Part then
compares the Kolstad decision with the Supreme Court’s earlier discussions of
employer liability in sexual harassment cases, finding the resulting standards to
be inconsistent. Finally, this Part highlights ambiguities in the new vicarious
liability standard that have already generated conflicting interpretations. Part
VI concludes that, in spite of the Court’s clarification of the underlying
meaning of the punitive damages provision in the 1991 Act, the Court defeated
its own efforts by setting forth an ambiguous “good-faith efforts” defense.
II. EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Title VII is one of three federal statutes at the core of employment
discrimination law.21 The statute makes it unlawful for an employer, “(1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”22 Limiting, segregating or
classifying employees or applicants, so as to deprive protected individuals of

18. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
19. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
20. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
21. The other core statutes are the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213 (1994 & Supp. III 1997), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
621–634 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See ROBERT BELTON & DIANNE AVERY, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 29-35 (6th ed. 1999), for an exhaustive discussion of the federal laws on
employment discrimination.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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employment opportunities or adversely affect their employment status, is also
unlawful under the statute.23
Title VII defines “employer” to include “a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees” and “any agent of
such a person.”24 The statute does not define the term “agent.” In addition, the
statute does not specify whether an “agent” may be individually liable under
Title VII. However, eleven of the twelve circuit courts have held that
individuals are not personally liable for discrimination under Title VII.25 The
Fourth Circuit is among this majority. In Lissau v. Southern Food Services,
Inc., the court explained that it would not make sense “to hold that Title VII
does not apply to a five-person company but applies with full force to a person
who supervises an identical number of employees in a larger company.”26 In
addition, the Fourth Circuit viewed Congress’ silence on the issue when it
added additional Title VII remedies in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to mean
that the statute does not impose individual liability.27
III. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Although sexual harassment is not a new phenomenon, it was not even
recognized as a viable legal complaint twenty years ago.28 The most
influential proponent of the idea that sexual harassment should be an
actionable form of sex discrimination was Catherine MacKinnon.29 In her
1979 book, Sexual Harassment of Working Women, MacKinnon proposed two
actionable forms of harassment: (1) “quid pro quo, in which sexual compliance
is exchanged, or proposed to be exchanged, for an employment opportunity,”
and (2) “sexual harassment [that] is a persistent condition of work.”30 In 1980,
the EEOC published guidelines providing that sex discrimination encompassed
claims of sexual harassment; the guidelines also accepted MacKinnon’s two
theories of liability for sexual harassment.31 In the 1986 case of Meritor
23. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
24. Id. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added). This term is similarly described in the ADA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5)(A) and in the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
25. See Alan R. Kabat & Debra S. Katz, Racial and Sexual Harassment Employment Law,
SE05 ALI-ABA 547, 601 (1999) (citing cases illustrative of this general rule).
26. Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998).
27. Id. at 180-81; see infra discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in Part IV.A.
28. See BELTON & AVERY, supra note 21, at 400.
29. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
30. Id. at 32.
31. See Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1998).
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature . . . when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission
to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment
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Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, the Supreme Court also recognized “quid pro
quo” and “hostile work environment” as the two actionable forms of sexual
harassment.32
A.

Meritor Savings Bank

Mechelle Vinson was a bank teller who brought a sexual harassment suit
against her employer and supervisor.33 She claimed that her supervisor’s
unwelcome sexual advances had created an “offensive” or “hostile working
environment,” in violation of Title VII.34 In a unanimous decision, the
Supreme Court held that the language of Title VII is not limited to
Rather,
discrimination that causes “economic” or “tangible” harm.35
actionable sexual harassment includes conduct linked to the grant or denial of
an economic “quid pro quo,” as well as conduct that has the purpose or effect
of creating a “hostile or abusive work environment.”36 The Court rejected the
appellate court’s finding of strict liability, but declined to offer a definitive rule
on employer liability for sexual harassment committed by supervisors.37

decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
Id.
32. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
33. Id. at 59-60.
34. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. Vinson was hired to work at Meritor Savings Bank in 1974, by
Sidney Taylor, a vice president of the bank. Id. at 59. She worked at the branch for four years,
and during that time she was promoted from teller-trainee, to teller, to head teller and finally to
branch manager. Id. at 59-60. After advising the bank that she was taking indefinite sick leave in
1978, she was fired. Id. at 60. Vinson then brought an action against Taylor and the bank, alleging
that she had “constantly been subjected to sexual harassment” by Taylor throughout her
employment. Id.
Vinson claimed that the harassment began when Taylor asked her to dinner and later
suggested they have sexual relations. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60. She claimed to have first refused
these advances, but out of fear of losing her job, she later submitted to them. Subsequently,
Taylor made repeated demands for sexual favors, both during and after work. Id. Vinson testified
that the two had intercourse on forty or fifty occasions during the course of her employment, and
said that on many occasions Taylor had forcibly raped her. Id.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that Vinson was not
the victim of sexual harassment or sex discrimination. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 61-62. The court also
addressed the bank’s liability, finding that the bank did not have notice of any harassment, and
therefore, could not be liable. Id. at 62. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed, finding that harassment includes a hostile work environment and
stating that an employer is absolutely liable for harassment by one of its supervisors, whether or
not the employer knew or should have known of such harassing conduct. Id. (emphasis added).
35. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
36. Id. at 65.
37. Id. at 72.
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Nevertheless, it agreed with the EEOC’s position that Congress wanted the
courts to look to agency principles for guidance.38 The Court, therefore, found
that although there are certain times when employers will be liable for the acts
of their supervisors, employers are not automatically liable.39 In addition, the
Court noted that neither absence of employer awareness, nor the mere
existence of a grievance procedure and discrimination policy and an
employee’s failure to utilize the reporting procedure, would always insulate an
employer from liability.40
After Meritor, the number of sexual harassment filings rose steadily.41
Although the courts consistently held employers vicariously liable for quid pro
quo sexual harassment,42 the standard for determining employer liability for
hostile environment harassment was more problematic.43 In Meritor, the Court
[The] debate over the appropriate standard for employer liability has a rather abstract
quality about it given the state of the record in this case. We do not know at this stage
whether Taylor made any sexual advances toward respondent at all, let alone whether
those advances were unwelcome, whether they were sufficiently pervasive to constitute a
condition of employment, or whether they were “so pervasive and so long continuing . . .
that the employer must have become conscious of [them].”
Id. (quoting Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1197-99 (8th Cir. 1981)).
38. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. (“While . . . common-law [agency] principles may not be
transferable in all their particulars to Title VII, Congress’ decision to define ‘employer’ to include
any ‘agent’ of an employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place some limits
on the acts of employees for which employers are to be held responsible.”).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Patricia M. Buhler, The Manager’s Role in Preventing Sexual Harassment,
SUPERVISION, Apr. 1999 (noting that about one-third of all Fortune 500 Companies have been
sued for sexual harassment since the Supreme Court’s decision in Meritor Savings Bank); see also
the statistics published by the EEOC, which demonstrate that the number of sexual harassment
charges have increased steadily since 1992. In 1992, 10,532 charges were filed, as compared to
15,222 charges filed last year. Sexual Harassment Charges EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY
1992-FY 1999 (last modified Jan. 12, 2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html>.
42. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-71 (“[T]he courts have consistently held employers liable for the
discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer
knew, should have known, or approved of the supervisor’s actions.”); Davis v. City of Sioux City,
115 F.3d 1365, 1367 (8th Cir. 1997) (“In the situation of quid pro quo sexual harassment by a
supervisor, where the harassment results in a tangible detriment to the subordinate employee,
liability is imputed to the employer.”); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Once
quid pro quo sexual harassment has been established, the harasser’s employer is, ipso facto,
liable.”).
43. See Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[A]n employer may not be held
liable for a supervisor’s hostile work environment harassment if the employer is able to establish
that it had adopted policies and implemented measures such that the victimized employee either
knew or should have known that the employer did not tolerate such conduct and that she could
report it to the employer without fear of adverse consequences.”). But see Karibian v. Columbia
Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[A]n employer is liable for the discriminatorily abusive
work environment created by a supervisor if the supervisor uses his actual or apparent authority to
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had recognized this as a viable form of sex discrimination, but left the lower
courts to grapple with a complex body of agency principles to define the
contours of employer liability.44 For the next twelve years, the lower courts
struggled to develop a standard for imputing liability to an employer for hostile
environment claims.45
B.

The 1998 Companion Cases

In 1998, the Supreme Court clarified the circumstances under which
employers would be held liable for hostile environment sexual harassment by
their supervisory agents in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth46 and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.47 A discussion of these cases is useful
because Kolstad addressed employer liability in the context of punitive
damages. As will be shown, the Court’s analysis in Kolstad was not entirely
consistent with its decisions in the 1998 companion cases.
1.

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth

Kimberly Ellerth was a salesperson for Burlington Industries.48 She
alleged that during her employment, she had been subject to constant sexual
harassment by Ted Slowik.49 Although Slowik was not Ellerth’s immediate
supervisor, he was the immediate supervisor of Ellerth’s boss.50 Ellerth argued
that three acts by Slowik could be construed as threats to deny tangible job
benefits, and therefore, the harassment should have been classified as quid pro
quo so as to impose vicarious liability on the employer.51

further the harassment, or if he was otherwise aided in accomplishing the harassment by the
existence of the agency relationship.”).
44. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
45. See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII
Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 66, 131-36 (1995) (discussing the varied standards of employer liability in hostile work
environment sexual harassment cases).
46. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
47. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
48. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 746.
49. Id. at 747. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted
summary judgment for Burlington Industries, finding that Ellerth had suffered no “tangible job
detriment,” and that she had failed to use the company’s complaint procedure or to make any
report at all to management. Id. at 749. Reversing en banc, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit “produced eight separate opinions and no consensus for a controlling
rationale.” Id.
50. Id. at 747.
51. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747-48. These threats included a statement that Slowik could make
the plaintiff’s life “very hard or very easy;” the expression of reservations about promoting the
plaintiff because she was not “easy;” and comments regarding the plaintiff’s attire, which
suggested she could make her job “much easier” by wearing shorter skirts. Id. at 748.
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The Court began by reviewing case law, in which the courts had
formulated different standards of employer liability, depending on whether the
claim was stated in terms of quid pro quo or hostile work environment
harassment.52 It explained that the lower courts had erred in using these
classifications to determine when liability could be extended to employers.53
Rather, the Court clarified that these two categories of harassment are only
relevant to the determination of whether discrimination under Title VII can be
proven.54 When a tangible employment action results from a refusal to submit
to a supervisor’s sexual demands, “the employment decision itself constitutes a
change in the terms and conditions of employment that is actionable under
Title VII [quid pro quo harassment].”55 However, when threats have not been
carried out but the harassment has, nevertheless, been severe or pervasive, a
claim for hostile work environment harassment arises.56 The Court placed
Ellerth’s case in the latter category, and formulated the issue as,
“[W]hether . . . an employee who refuses the unwelcome and threatening
sexual advances of a supervisor, yet suffers no adverse, tangible job
consequences, can recover against the employer without showing the employer
is negligent or otherwise at fault for the supervisor’s actions.”57 The Court
defined a “tangible employment action” as a “significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly differing responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits.”58
In determining whether Burlington Industries should be held vicariously
liable for the creation of a hostile work environment by its supervisor, the
Court looked to agency principles, as it had instructed the lower courts to do in
Meritor.59 Although it relied on the Restatement (Second) of Agency as a
starting point, the Court ultimately modified the Restatement principles to form
its own standard for imposing liability.60 The Court began by looking to
section 219(1), which provides that an employer may be vicariously liable
when the employee commits a tort “while acting in the scope of
employment.”61 The Court adopted a general rule that sexual harassment by a
52. Id. at 752-53.
53. Id. at 753.
54. Id. at 753.
55. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753-54.
56. Id. at 754 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 746-47.
58. Id. at 761.
59. Id. at 754-55 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72).
60. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
61. Id. at 756 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958)). The
Restatement also provides that even an intentional tort may be within the scope of employment
when it is “actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the [employer],” even if it is forbidden
by the employer. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228(1)(c), 230 & cmt. b (1958).
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supervisor is not conduct within the “scope of employment,” because
supervisors generally act out of their own personal motives of “gender-based
animus” or “sexual urges” when they discriminate and not to “serve the
employer.”62
The Court next looked to section 219(2), which imposes liability in limited
circumstances when employees act outside the scope of employment.63 The
Court ultimately found section 219(2)(d) to provide the proper basis for finding
employer liability in cases of supervisory harassment.64 The relevant part of
this section provides that an employer is liable for the acts of his employees
when the employees are “aided in accomplishing their tortious objective by the
existence of the agency relation.”65 In order to impose liability under this
standard, the Court thought it necessary to require something beyond the mere
existence of the employment relationship.66 The Court, therefore, determined

62. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756-57.
63. Id. at 758. This section provides:
A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of
their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance
upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of
the agency relation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958).
The Court clarified that subsection (a) addresses “direct liability,” where the employer
acts with tortious intent, and “indirect liability,” where the agent’s high rank makes him or her the
company’s “alter ego.” This provision of the Restatement was not applied in Ellerth because the
plaintiff did not contend that the supervisor’s rank was high enough to impute liability to the
corporation. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758.
Subsection (b) was viewed by the Court as an alternative ground for holding an
employer liable on account of a supervisor’s acts. The Court said that an employer would be
negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should have known about the conduct
and failed to stop it. The Court noted that while negligence sets a minimum standard for liability,
the plaintiff sought to invoke “the more stringent standard of vicarious liability.” Ellerth, 524
U.S. at 758-59.
Subsection (d) set forth two additional standards for employer vicarious liability. The
first of these standards is known as the “apparent authority standard.” Liability arises pursuant to
this standard when an agent “purports to exercise a power which he or she does not have, as
distinct from where the agent threatens to misuse actual power.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759. The
Court determined that in the usual case of supervisory harassment, the misuse of actual power is
involved. For this reason, the Court declined to apply the “apparent agency standard.” Id. at 75960. The second standard set forth in subsection (d) is the “aided in the agency relation standard.”
This is the standard that the Court opted to apply. Id.
64. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
65. Id.
66. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760. The purpose of the additional requirement was explained in
light of the fact that most workplace harassers are aided in accomplishing their tort by the
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that an employer would be strictly liable under the “aided-in-the-agencyrelation” standard when a supervisor subjects a subordinate to a “tangible
employment action.”67 As the Court emphasized,
Tangible employment actions are the means by which the supervisor
brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates. A tangible
employment decision requires an official act of the enterprise, a company act.
The decision in most cases is documented in official company records, and
may be subject to review by higher level supervisors . . . .
For these reasons, a tangible employment action taken by the supervisor
becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the employer.68

Because the Court had classified Slowik’s harassment of Ellerth as hostile
working environment harassment, (harassment which did not involve a
tangible employment action), the Court announced a two-tiered system of
liability.69 First, the Court found an employer would be vicariously liable to a
victimized employee when a supervisor “with immediate (or successively
higher) authority” creates a hostile working environment.70 When a tangible
employment action has been taken against the employee, the employer is
strictly liable.71 When the supervisor has taken no tangible employment
action, the employer will have the right to raise a reasonable care defense.72
The affirmative defense consist of two parts: “(a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”73 The Court also held that proof of an
enforced antiharassment policy with a complaint procedure, although not
necessary, could be relevant to the successful assertion of the employer’s
defense.74 Similarly, the Court said that proof the employee’s failure to utilize
the complaint procedure would normally suffice to satisfy the second element
of the defense.75

existence of the agency relationship alone through close proximity and regular contact with a
captive pool of victims at work. Id. If the employment relationship itself were enough to make an
employer strictly liable, employers would be subject to liability not only for supervisory
harassment, but for all coworker harassment. Id.
67. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
68. Id. at 762.
69. Id. at 764-65.
70. Id.at 765.
71. Id.
72. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 765.
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Faragher v. City of Boca Raton

Faragher differs from Ellerth only in its depth of analysis. In this case, the
United States Supreme Court explained in more detail the rationale for holding
employers liable in limited circumstances for the unauthorized actions of
supervisory agents. In addition, the Court discussed employer liability on the
basis of a “proxy” or “alter ego” theory. Although this theory was not the basis
for liability in Faragher, the discussion is significant in light of the Court’s
subsequent decision in Kolstad.
Beth Ann Faragher worked as a lifeguard for the City of Boca Raton while
attending college.76 Throughout her employment, she was the subject of a
“sexually hostile environment,” created by the lewd comments and offensive
touching of her immediate supervisors, Bill Terry and David Silverman.77
Faragher eventually resigned from her job and sued the supervisors and the
city.78 She alleged that the supervisors were agents of the city and that their
conduct amounted to discrimination in violation of Title VII.79
In a decision written by Justice Souter, the Supreme Court reversed the
Eleventh Circuit’s judgment in favor of the city, relying on the same standard
used in Ellerth.80 One issue that the Court explored more expansively than it
had in Ellerth, was the idea that employers are strictly liable when the
individual creating the abusive atmosphere is a high-echelon manager, such as
the president of the company.81 The Court noted that such an individual is
“indisputably within that class of an employer organization’s officials who
may be treated as the organization’s proxy.”82

76. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
77. Id. The complaint included allegations that Silverman had told Faragher that she could
date him or “clean the toilets for a year.” Faragher also alleged that Terry had said a woman
would never be promoted to the ranks of lieutenant under his supervision. Id. The city had a
sexual harassment policy, but the policy was never circulated to Terry, Silverman or several of
the lifeguards. Id. at 781-82.
78. Id. at 780.
79. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 781. Terry’s supervisory authority included hiring lifeguards,
supervising work assignments, engaging in counseling, delivering oral reprimands, and making
disciplinary records. Id. Silverman had the authority to make daily assignments. In addition, he
supervised the lifeguards’ work and fitness training. Id.
80. Id. at 807.
81. Id. at 789.
82. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789-90 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993))
(noting that the standards for binding the employer were not in issue because the harasser was the
corporate president); see also Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir.
1992) (finding employer automatically liable for harassment perpetrated by the owner); Torres v.
Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 634-635 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 563 (1997) (when a
supervisor holds a sufficiently high position in the company’s management hierarchy, his actions
may be automatically imputed to the employer)).
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In addition, the Court found that employers have been routinely held liable
for discriminatory employment actions by supervisors with tangible results,
such as firing, withholding promotions, and assigning unfavorable job duties.83
The Court discussed several theories set forth by the lower courts that
supported employer liability in this context.84 One such theory was the “proxy
theory.”85 Under this theory, when a supervisor makes decisions with tangible
job effects, the supervisor merges with the employer, and the acts become
those of the employer.86
The Faragher Court then discussed the theories for finding an employer
vicariously liable for the discriminatory acts of mid-level supervisors.87 As it
had in Ellerth, the Court rejected the idea that an employer becomes liable
under section 219(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency for torts
committed by a supervisor in the scope of employment when the tort is sex
discrimination.88 The Court was guided by two principles.89 First, the Court
discussed the distinction between actions that are within the scope of
employment and acts amounting to “frolics” or “detours” from the ordinary
course of employment.90 It concluded that there was no reason to believe
Congress sought to ignore the distinction.91 Next, the Court noted that in
assessing employer liability for coworker harassment under a negligence
standard, the circuit courts had uniformly found acts of harassment to be
outside the scope of common employees’ duties.92
The Court next turned to the “aided-in-the-agency-relation” principle
found in section 219(2)(d).93 As in Ellerth, the Court found that this section
provided a basis for vicarious liability when a supervisor uses his authority to
harass a subordinate.94 The Court, nevertheless, gave deference to Meritor’s
holding that employers are not “automatically” liable for harassment by a
supervisor.95 To counter the tension created by an imposition of liability based
on the aided-in-the-agency-relation standard where the “aid” was an unspoken
threat of retaliation, the Court applied the same standard that was employed in
Ellerth.96 This would make the employer strictly liable only if the supervisor
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790.
Id. at 790-91.
Id. at 790.
Id.
Id. at 792.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 798.
Id.
Id. at 799.
Id.
Id.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 801.
Id. at 802.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 807.
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committed an affirmative act of retaliation.97 Otherwise, the employer would
have available the affirmative defense that the employer exercised reasonable
care to avoid harassment and the employee failed to take advantage of the
employer’s safeguards to prevent the harm.98
3.

Policy Underlying Ellerth and Faragher

A compelling policy rationale underlies the Supreme Court’s decisions in
these companion cases. In both cases, the Court stressed that the underlying
purpose of Title VII is to encourage forward thinking by employers as
demonstrated by the creation of antiharassment policies and effective
grievance methods.99 The Court believed that analyzing an employer’s effort
to implement and enforce such procedures as a means of determining liability
would effect Congress’ intent to promote conciliation, as opposed to
litigation.100 The Court also anticipated that its decisions would have a
deterrent effect, as they would encourage employees to report harassing
conduct before the conduct became severe or pervasive.101 As summed up in
Faragher, “[I]t . . . implement[s] clear statutory policy and complement[s] the
Government’s Title VII enforcement efforts to recognize the employer’s
affirmative obligation to prevent violations and give credit . . . to employers
who make reasonable efforts to discharge their duty.”102
IV. EMPLOYER LIABILITY & PUNITIVE DAMAGES
At the time the Supreme Court rendered its decisions in Faragher and
Ellerth, a circuit split over yet another Title VII issue had developed.103 This
time, the courts were struggling to determine the burden of proof plaintiffs had
to meet in order to receive punitive damages awards from employers pursuant
to the Civil Rights Act of 1991.104 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n to clarify the precise requirements of the
punitive damages standard set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) of the 1991
Act.105

97. Id.
98. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
99. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805.
100. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
101. Id.
102. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806.
103. See Baty v. Williamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1244 & n.6 (10th Cir. 1999)
(identifying the circuit split); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.
104. Id. at 1244.
105. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 533.
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The Civil Rights Act of 1991

Prior to 1991, only equitable remedies, including reinstatement and back
pay, were available for violations of Title VII and the ADA.106 Under the
terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, compensatory and punitive damages
were made available for actions arising under these statutes.107 Presently, these
damages awards are limited to cases of “intentional discrimination.”108 The
expansion of monetary relief was largely a response to the argument that it was
unfair to deny compensatory and punitive damages for sex or disability
discrimination when these damages could be recovered in race discrimination
cases arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.109 However, in promulgating the 1991
Act, Congress also expressed a goal of deterrence.110 The congressional
findings state that “additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter
unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace.”111
Nevertheless, the monetary relief made available by the 1991 Act is limited.112
Congress capped the amount of compensatory and punitive damages for Title
VII and ADA violations.113 The damages cap ranges from $50,000 to
$300,000, depending on the size of the employer.114

106. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)-(2). Before the 1991 Amendment, compensatory and
punitive damages were available under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 only to those who had suffered race or
ethnic discrimination. David A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, ALI-ABA Continuing Legal
Education, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, SB36 ALI-ABA 277, 291-92 (1997); see also Johnson
v. Ry. Express, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (finding that the legal relief for an employment
discrimination case arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 includes compensatory and punitive
damages).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1)-(2). The two basic theories of employment discrimination law are
disparate treatment and disparate impact. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335 n.15 (1977). “Disparate treatment” discrimination occurs when an employer treats one group
of individuals less favorably based on their race, color, sex, religion or national origin. Id.
Subjective intent to discriminate is essential in disparate treatment cases. Id. “Disparate impact”
discrimination refers to “employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity.” Id.
109. BELTON & AVERY, supra note 21, at 807.
110. 42 U.S.C § 1981 (note) (1994).
111. Id.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
113. Id.
114. Id. The cap is $50,000 for employers with more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees;
$100,000 for employers with more than 100 and fewer than 201 employees; $200,000 for
employers with more than 200 and fewer than 501 employees; and $300,000 for employers with
more than 500 employees. Id. The Act also states that these caps do not apply to race
discrimination claims arising under § 1981. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(4).
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Divergent Standards Emerge for Awarding Punitive Damages

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was a quickly adopted compromise, without
committee hearings or reports, and with only limited floor debate on the final
provisions of the Act.115 For this reason, there were few traditional legislative
sources to give meaning to the Act.116 With little to guide their interpretations,
the circuit courts struggled to define the precise burden of proof a plaintiff was
required to meet to receive a punitive damages award.117
The confusion arose from the language of the 1991 Act, which begins by
making compensatory and punitive damages available in cases of “intentional
discrimination.”118 The Act then provides that complainants may recover
punitive damages when they prove that a defendant has engaged in a
discriminatory practice “with malice or with reckless indifference to . . .
federally protected rights.”119 Many courts interpreted this to mean that the
plaintiff’s punitive damages burden under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a required
something more than mere proof of “intentional discrimination.” While the
1991 Act itself does not, on its face, condition punitive damage awards on
evidence of “egregious” or “outrageous” discrimination, many circuits
formulated standards that required evidence of such conduct.”120 These courts
115. Cathcart & Snyderman, supra note 107, at 295-97.
116. See id. The only sources of guidance relevant to the punitive damages inquiry include (1)
the vetoed Civil Rights Act of 1990, and H.R.1, which the House passed before Senator Danforth
presented the bill that became the 1991 Act; and (2) Interpretive memoranda entered into the
Congressional Record by Senators and Representatives. See id.
117. See Baty, 172 F.3d at 1244 & n.6 (discussing the circuit split); see also Ngo v. Reno
Hilton Resort Corp., 104 F.3d 1299, 1304 n.9 (9th Cir. 1998) (same).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)-(2).
119. Id. § 1981a(b)(1).
120. See Baty, 172 F.3d at 1244-45 (declining to determine comprehensively what burden a
plaintiff must carry in order to prove “malice or reckless indifference to . . . federally protected
rights”). The Tenth Circuit upheld the punitive damages award against Baty’s employer for
sexual harassment that had been committed primarily by coworkers. Id. The court said even if
more than merely intentional discrimination was required in order to recover punitive damages
under Title VII, this burden was met by evidence that management didn’t respond to the
plaintiff’s complaints of harassment and had conducted a “sham” investigation of the
discriminatory acts. Id.
See also Ngo, 140 F.3d at 1304 (finding punitive damages to be warranted only when the
plaintiff makes a showing beyond the threshold level of intent required for compensatory liability
and only where the acts giving rise to liability “are willful and egregious, or display reckless
indifference to the plaintiff’s federal rights.”); Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 982
(4th Cir. 1997) (“Punitive damages are ‘an extraordinary remedy,’ to be reserved for egregious
cases.”); Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Co., 95 F.3d 627, 636 (7th Cir. 1996) (characterizing the
punitive damages standard as a “higher hurdle than merely proving the underlying unlawful
discrimination.”); McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Restaurant, 83 F.3d 498, 508 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting
that unlike compensatory damages, punitive damages “are never awarded as a matter of right no
matter how egregious the defendant’s conduct.”); Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d
1211, 1216 (6th Cir. 1996) (despite sufficiency of evidence for liability, evidence held
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were guided by statements extracted from the legislative history,121 and by the
policy that punitive damages are designed to punish and deter outrageous
conduct.122 After determining the plaintiff’s burden under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a,
many of these courts went on to assess the punitive damages liability of the
employers for the discriminatory conduct of their employees.123
The minority view rejected the idea that the plaintiff’s burden of proof
included proof of “extraordinarily egregious” discrimination.124 In support of
this position, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit looked
to the plain language of the statute, which does not explicitly require evidence
of “egregious” acts.125 In addition, the Second Circuit was able to find support
for its minority position in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1991.126
insufficient for punitive damages); Karcher v. Emerson Elec. Co., 94 F.3d 502, 509 (8th Cir.
1996) (same).
121. See Ngo, 140 F.3d at 1303 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 91-40(I), at 72 (1991), which states that
“[p]laintiffs must first prove intentional discrimination . . . and must meet an even higher
standard . . . to recover punitive damages.”) (also citing interpretive memo of Sen. Dole, 137
CONG. REC. S15472-01 (Oct. 30, 1991), which states, “Punitive damages are to be awarded only
in extraordinarily egregious cases.”).
122. McKinnon, 83 F.3d at 508 (“Punitive damages are assessed as punishment or as an
example and warning to others. They are therefore not favored in the law and are allowed only
with caution and within normal limits.”); see also Harris, 132 F.3d at 983 (noting that the
“provision was enacted against a backdrop of prevailing doctrine that punitive damages are to be
awarded only in cases where the twin aims of punishment and deterrence are paramount.”).
123. See, e.g., Harris, 132 F.3d at 984. Harris involved the harassment of two employees by a
coworker. Id. at 980-81. The employees repeatedly complained to their managers about the
harassment so as to put the employer on notice of the improper conduct. Id. The court first found
that punitive damages were to be reserved for egregious cases. It then said in order for a plaintiff
to reach a jury on the issue of punitive damages, a plaintiff must generally make a “‘heightened
showing’ of the culpable state of mind of the employer, not just of the harasser.” Id. at 983. The
court found that the employer’s failure to implement a sexual harassment or grievance policy, and
its utter failure to respond in any way to repeated complaints of pervasive sexual harassment were
sufficient to show the culpability of the employer. Id.
In Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Fifth Circuit also found the
employer liable in punitive damages by applying the Ellerth/Faragher vicarious liability analysis.
156 F.3d 581, 592-94 (5th Cir. 1998), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated sub nom Williams
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 169 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1999), and opinion reinstated on reh’g, 182 F.3d
333 (5th Cir. 1999), and opinion vacated, 188 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (reinstating
the jury verdict awarding punitive damages in light of Supreme Court’s decision in Kolstad).
124. See, e.g., Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1997).
125. Id.
126. Luciano, 110 F.3d 220 (citing Rep. Edwards’ statement in 137 CONG. REC. H9527
(1991), which provides “[p]unitive damages are available under [Section 1981a] to the same
extent and under the same standards that they are available to plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.”)
(also citing H.R. REP. NO. 40(II), at 24 (1991), which provides, “It is the Committee’s intention
that damages should be awarded under Title VII in the same circumstances in which such awards
are now permitted under [42] U.S.C. § 1981 in intentional race discrimination cases.”).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
was faced with these alternative standards when it first reviewed the district
court’s decision in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n.127 A panel of the court
initially followed the minority approach when it found that evidence of
intentional discrimination was sufficient to support a punitive damages
award.128 However, upon rehearing the case en banc, the circuit court vacated
the panel decision, finding that punitive damages could be imposed in a Title
VII action only upon proof of “egregious” conduct.129 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
C. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n
1.

Facts and Procedural History

A summary of the lower court decisions, culminating with the Supreme
Court’s decision in June 1999, follows. This section is especially significant in
light of the elaborate procedural history. A close analysis reveals that the
Court’s rationale with respect to imputing employer liability in punitive
damages reflects much of the insight set forth by Circuit Judge Tatel in his
dissent from the en banc opinion.130
In the fall of 1992, Carol Kolstad, an employee of the American Dental
Association (ADA), learned of Jack O’Donnell’s upcoming retirement from
his positions as Director of Legislation and Legislative Policy and Director of
the Council on Government Affairs of the ADA.131 O’Donnell was the
second-highest ranking officer in the ADA’s Washington office.132 Kolstad,
who had been serving as Director of Federal Agency Relations for four years,
expressed an interest in filling O’Donnell’s vacancy.133 A lawyer herself,
Kolstad had handled federal regulatory matters for the ADA in her then-current
position. She consistently received “distinguished” performance evaluations
from Leonard Wheat, the director of the ADA’s Washington office.134 Tom
Spangler, Legislative Counsel for the ADA, also expressed an interest in

127. 108 F.3d 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
128. Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1438.
129. 139 F.3d 958, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
130. See discussion of Circuit Judge Tatel’s en banc dissent infra notes 163-75 and
accompanying text.
131. Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1434.
132. Id. The ADA is a Chicago-based professional association. The Washington branch exists
to represent the Association’s interests before Congress and the federal agencies. Id.
133. Id.
134. Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1434. Kolstad had previously spent six years with the Office of the
General Counsel of the Department of Defense. In that capacity, she drafted proposed legislation,
prepared testimony for congressional hearings, and represented the Department’s interests on
Capitol Hill. Id. at 1434.
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succeeding to O’Donnell’s positions.135 Spangler had been with the ADA for
less than two years.136 He had also received favorable work evaluations from
Wheat.137
Despite his authority to make the appointment, Wheat requested that
Executive Director William Allen make the final promotion decision.138
Subsequently, Wheat set to work revising the “Position Description
Questionnaire” for the upcoming vacancy. The revised questionnaire included
verbatim several of the same responsibilities that had been listed in the job
description that was used to hire Spangler for his then-current position.139 In
addition, three months prior to O’Donnell’s retirement, Wheat completed a
performance evaluation of Spangler.140 The evaluation stated that one of
Spangler’s “goals” was to “provide management and administrative
support . . . for the Council on Government Affairs.”141 At the time, this
specific task was being performed by O’Donnell.142 After the job was formally
posted, Kolstad and Spangler applied for the position.143 Ultimately, Allen
promoted Spangler based on Wheat’s recommendation.144
After exhausting administrative remedies, Kolstad brought a Title VII
action against the ADA for sex and gender discrimination, seeking equitable
remedies and damages.145 She alleged that the application process was a sham,
and that Spangler was chosen before the formal selection process even
began.146 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit
found that the stated reasons for promoting Spangler were pretextual and
awarded Kolstad back pay in the amount of $52,718.147 The district court
denied Kolstad’s motion for instatement and the payment of attorney’s fees.148

135. Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1434.
136. Id.
137. Id. His prior work experience included five years of lobbying on behalf of the National
Treasury Employees Union. Id.
138. Id.
139. Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1434.
140. Id. at 1434-35.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1435. Kolstad applied only after Wheat had refused to meet with
her to discuss her interest in the position. Id. Kolstad also introduced evidence that Wheat had
told sexually offensive jokes and had referred to prominent professional women in derogatory
terms. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 531.
144. Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1435.
145. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 531.
146. Id.
147. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 912 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D.C. 1996).
148. Kolstad, 912 F. Supp. at 16.
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Most significantly, the district court refused to instruct the jury regarding
punitive damages.149
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
found that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on punitive
damages.150 This court first determined that the jury could have reasonably
concluded that Kolstad proved intentional sex discrimination by the ADA.151
Next, the court noted that the damages remedies were added to Title VII as a
means of deterring “unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the
workplace.”152 To advance this congressional goal, the court looked to the
plain language of the statute.153 It pointed out that this language tracked the
standard courts had formulated to sustain punitive damages awards under other
civil rights statutes, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.154 The court
149. Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1435.
150. Id. at 1437.
151. Id.
The allocation of burdens and order of proof in Title VII discriminatory treatment cases
was set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973). Under the
McDonnell Douglas standard, the plaintiff has the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of
discrimination. Id. at 802. If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing the prima facie case, an
inference of discrimination is raised. The employer may rebut the discrimination with evidence of
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for rejecting the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff bears the
ultimate burden of persuading the jury of intentional discrimination. Id. at 802-05. “[R]ejection of
the defendant’s proffered [nondiscriminatory] reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the
ultimate fact of intentional discrimination . . . .” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
511 (1993) (emphasis added).
Because the district court found that Kolstad had met her prima facie case of
discrimination, the ADA had the burden of presenting evidence of nondiscriminatory reasons for
denying her the promotion. Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1436. The ADA argued that even if Spangler had
been preselected for the promotion, a reasonable jury could not have found that Kolstad was a
victim of sex discrimination, because evidence supported other nondiscriminatory reasons for her
rejection. Id. The district court, however, found that Kolstad had presented sufficient evidence for
a jury to conclude that these “proffered nondiscriminatory reasons” were actually pretexts. Id. at
1437. The fact finder could therefore infer discrimination. Id. at 1436.
152. Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1437 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (note) (1994)).
153. Id.
154. Id. Section 1981 provides: “All person within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts” and “to the full
and equal benefit of all laws . . . as is enjoyed by all white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). This
statute was originally section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. BELTON & AVERY, supra note
21, at 29. Today, § 1981 is an integral part of employment law regime, as it prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race in public and private employment. Id. Section 1983 is unlike §
1981 in that rather than providing substantive rights, it gives individuals a cause of action for the
deprivation of substantive rights guaranteed by other federal laws and the Constitution. Id. at 2930.
In Smith v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court set forth the standard for awarding
punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). The case involved an inmate
who sued a prison guard, alleging that the guard had failed to protect him from violent physical
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explained that in actions brought pursuant to these sections, evidence sufficient
to establish an intentional violation of protected civil rights may also support a
punitive damages award.155 The court adopted this standard of proof for
claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a as well.156 The circuit court therefore
concluded that because Kolstad could have proved intentional discrimination,
the jury should have been instructed that it could also consider a punitive
damages award if it found that the employer acted with malice or reckless
indifference to Kolstad’s federally protected rights.157
Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit granted en banc review.158 In a 6-5 decision, the court
reversed the panel and affirmed the district court’s denial of a jury instruction
on punitive damages.159 Looking at the two-tiered structure of the damages
standard in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, the court noted that there was “one standard for
basic liability” and “another for the exceptional remedy of punitive
liability.”160 Therefore, before the punitive damages issue could go to the jury,
the court said evidence of the defendant’s culpability must exceed what is
necessary to show intentional discrimination.161 Based on statements in the
legislative history of the 1991 Act, as well as the Supreme Court’s discussion
of the punitive damages standard for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Smith v.
Wade, the court concluded that an award of punitive damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b)(1) also required evidence of “egregious conduct.”162

and sexual abuse and had therefore violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 32. The language
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not include a punitive damages remedy, so the Court looked to the
common law. Id. at 34-35. The Court held that punitive damages are available in an action
brought pursuant to § 1983, when the defendant’s conduct is “motivated by evil motive or intent,
or when it involve[d] reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”
Id. at 56.
155. Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1438.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 960.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 962.
161. Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 962. The majority based this finding partially on the fact that
Congress had included a “special standard” in a separate provision for the imposition of punitive
damages. Id. at 961.
162. Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 965. The majority referenced many of the same statements in the
legislative history of the 1991 Act that the lower courts had referenced in interpreting 42 U.S.C. §
1981a to include an element of “egregiousness” in the punitive damages standard. Id. at 962. See
also supra discussion accompanying note 121.
Although the panel majority interpreted the language and interpretations of §§ 1981 and
1983 to mean that a jury instruction on punitive damages should be available in a § 1981a action
upon the mere proof of the intentional discrimination, the en banc court, noted that there were
mixed interpretations of the punitive damages standard under § 1981. Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 96263. It pointed out that four courts have construed § 1981 to require proof of egregious conduct
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Circuit Judge Tatel, who had written the panel’s majority opinion,
dissented from the en banc decision.163 He found the majority’s decision
“nullifie[d] the plain language of section 1981a(b)(1)’s reckless indifference
standard,” and conflicted with the punitive damages standard set forth in Smith
v. Wade.164 Judge Tatel read Smith v. Wade as requiring that the defendant
have “subjective consciousness of risk . . . of unlawfulness.”165 He concluded
that 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) allows a punitive damages award if “the employer
knew of Title VII’s prohibitions and acted regardless or disregarded a
substantial risk of violating the statute.”166 Judge Tatel explained that to
determine liability, the court should ask, “Did the employer intentionally take
account of sex?”167 To determine if the reckless indifference standard has been
met, the court should then ask, “When the employer discriminated, was it
aware of its legal obligations?”168 The imposition of these two separate
inquiries, Judge Tatel said, would give employers the opportunity to introduce
evidence “to demonstrate that they did everything they could to comply with
the law and were therefore not recklessly indifferent to their legal
obligations.”169
Judge Tatel said that there were two categories of cases in which
employers might not meet the reckless indifference standard. The first
category included cases where the employer did intend the discriminatory act,
but did not know that the act violated the law.170 The second category included
cases where an agent used his or her position to commit an intentional act of
discrimination.171 Judge Tatel noted that the emphasis in the latter category of
cases is on the employer’s awareness of its legal obligations.172 If the person
discriminating is “the same as the employer” or is “the employer’s entire
decision-making apparatus,” there would be “no difference between the

beyond mere discrimination, while others have found proof of intentional discrimination to be
sufficient for a punitive damages instruction. Id. at 963. The en banc court also noted that the text
of § 1981a was distinguishable from the text of § 1981, which does not include a separate
provision for punitive damages. Id. See also discussion of Smith v. Wade supra note 154.
163. Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 970 (Tatel, J., dissenting). Chief Judge Edwards and Circuit Judges
Wald, Rogers and Garland joined his dissent. The Supreme Court majority adopted the views
expressed in Tatel’s dissent in large part, although ultimately it found that something more than
intentional discrimination was required before a plaintiff would be eligible for a punitive damages
award. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.a-b.
164. Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 971.
165. Id. at 971 (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 38 n.6).
166. Id.
167. Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 973.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 973-74.
171. Id. at 974.
172. Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 974.
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employer’s awareness of its legal obligations and the employee’s.”173 “But
where a gap exists in the agency relationship between the agent and the entity
being held liable,” an employer could argue that it should not be liable in
punitive damages because it “had undertaken good-faith efforts to comply with
Title VII.”174
Judge Tatel applied the reckless indifference standard to the case and
found that the jury should have been allowed to consider punitive damages
because (1) the ADA was found to have intentionally discriminated against
Kolstad, (2) the ADA never argued that it made good-faith efforts to comply
with the law, (3) the case did not involve complex or novel issues of liability,
and (4) the decision to deny the promotion was made by the ADA’s executive
director, rather than a low-level employee.175
2.

The Majority Opinion—Justice O’Connor

a.

Punitive Damages May be Imposed Absent a Showing of “Egregious”
or “Outrageous” Discrimination.176

In a 7-2 decision written by Justice O’Connor, the United States Supreme
Court vacated the D.C. Circuit’s en banc decision.177 Justices Stevens, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined this part of the opinion.178
Although the Court found that Title VII requires plaintiffs to present more than
proof of intentional discrimination, which is the standard for receiving
compensatory damages, it rejected the idea that proof of “egregious” conduct
is necessary.179 The terms “malice” and “reckless indifference” were found
not to pertain to the employer’s awareness that it is discriminating, but to its
knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law.180
The Court noted that its emphasis on the employer’s state of mind was
consistent with the 1991 Act’s distinction between equitable and compensatory
relief as well, because compensatory damages are limited to cases of

173. Id.
174. Id. at 974. Judge Tatel noted that some of these “good-faith efforts” might include, hiring
“staff and managers sensitive to Title VII responsibilities, . . . requiring effective EEO training,
or . . . developing and using objective hiring and promotion standards.” Id.
175. Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 975.
176. This section correlates with Part II-A of the majority opinion. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 533.
Part I-A of the majority opinion set forth the facts of the case. Id. at 530. Part II-B set forth the
procedural posture of the case. Id. at 531.
177. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 546.
178. Id. at 528.
179. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 534-35 (“We credit the en banc majority’s effort to effectuate
congressional intent, but, in the end, we reject its conclusion that eligibility for punitive damages
can only be described in terms of an employer’s ‘egregious’ misconduct.”).
180. Id. at 535.
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“intentional discrimination.”181 In addition, the Court explained that the
further qualification placed on punitive damages in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)
was representative of Congress’ intent to narrow the class of cases for which
punitive damages are available to a subset of those involving intentional
discrimination.182
The Court looked to its decision in Smith v. Wade to assist in determining
the meaning of the terms “malice” and “reckless indifference” as used in 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).183 In Smith v. Wade, the Court found that proof of “evil
motive or intent” or “reckless or callous indifference to federally protected
rights” would support a punitive damages award.184 The Supreme Court also
found in Smith v. Wade that the “intent standard” required “a ‘subjective
consciousness’ of a risk of injury or illegality and ‘a criminal indifference to
civil obligations.’”185 Applying this standard to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, the Court
concluded that “an employer must at least discriminate in the face of a
perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law to be liable in punitive
damages.”186 It noted that although egregious conduct is evidence of the
requisite mental state, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) does not limit plaintiffs to this
form of evidence.187
The Court also noted that because this interpretation of the language of 42
U.S.C. § 1981a requires employers to know they are violating federal law,
there will be circumstances in which intentional discrimination will not give
rise to punitive damages liability.188 Such circumstances include those where
the employer is not familiar with the federal prohibition or discriminates with
the belief that such discrimination is lawful.189 Other circumstances might
include those in which the underlying theory of discrimination is novel or the
employer reasonably believes that the discrimination satisfies a bona fide
occupational qualification defense.190

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 535-36.
184. Id. at 536.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 538-39 (citing the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and Punitive
Damages Available Under § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which lists “the degree of
egregiousness and nature of the respondent’s conduct” as one piece of evidence tending to show
malice or reckless disregard).
188. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536-37 (adopting a position similar to that taken by Circuit Judge
Tatel in his dissent from the en banc decision).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 536-37. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification is set forth in § 703(e)(1) of
Title VII, and provides:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ
employees . . . on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
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Imputing Acts of Managerial Agents to Employers & the “Good-Faith
Efforts” Defense191

After explaining the burden of proof that a plaintiff must carry in order to
receive punitive damages under the 1991 Act, Justice O’Connor went on to set
forth a standard for imputing vicarious liability to employers.192 Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joined this part of the
opinion.193 In support of its decision to address the vicarious liability issue, the
majority referenced the en banc dissent and majority opinions, which had
discussed the limits that agency principles place on vicarious liability for
punitive damages.194 The majority also cited the Solicitor General’s amicus
brief and responses during oral argument.195 The majority viewed the legal
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). This defense has been construed as an “extremely narrow exception”
to Title VII, which cannot be based upon “stereotypical characterizations.” Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
191. This section correlates with Part II-B of the majority opinion; see Kolstad, 527 U.S. at
535.
192. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 535.
193. Id. at 528.
194. Id. at 540.
In the en banc dissent, Judge Tatel cited Meritor for the proposition that employers are
generally held liable in traditional Title VII cases for injuries caused by employees acting within
the scope of employment. Therefore, juries attribute the employee’s discrimination on the basis of
a prohibited criterion to the employer. See Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 974. However, Tatel noted that
“attribution of an employee’s state of mind differs when the jury turns to the question of punitive
damages.” Id. This is because punitive damages are intended to punish employers for their
employees’ discriminatory acts. Id. Noting that the emphasis is on the employer’s knowledge of
its legal obligations, the dissenting opinion found it necessary for a jury to examine the
employer’s awareness of the law where the employee making the hiring or firing decision does
not constitute the employer’s “entire decision-making apparatus.” Id. The en banc dissent also
noted that a jury determination is not necessary when the person discriminating is “the same as
the employer.” Id.
195. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 540-41.
Solicitor General Seth Waxman addressed the applicability of such agency principles
during oral argument in response to a series of questions posed by the Court. The Court’s initial
question was whether a company had to be conscious of the wrongful activity, or if knowledge by
some lesser employee would suffice for punitive damages liability under Title VII and the ADA.
General Waxman noted that the lower courts were unanimous in the view that individuals may
not be sued for Title VII violations, and therefore the defendant will always be the employer. He
then said the question as to who had to be “conscious” of the wrongdoing was “not really
presented.” General Waxman attempted to voice his agreement with the petitioner’s attorney,
who had noted that the culpable officers were highest-ranking officials of the respondent’s
association. After being asked to enunciate a principle, he referenced the agency principle in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, section 217C(c), which provides that an employee’s conduct
may be imputed to the employer if the agent is employed in a managerial capacity and acts within
the scope of his employment. He advocated the position that an employer should be liable in
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standard for imputing liability to an employer to be “subsumed” by the
question presented.196 Nevertheless, the Court refrained from applying the
vicarious liability principles to the facts of the case.197
The Court began its analysis by looking to the limits that common law
agency principles place on the imposition of vicarious liability for punitive
damages awards.198 As it had in Meritor, Ellerth and Faragher, the Court
stated it would interpret Title VII according to these agency principles.199 In
support of its decision to impose limits on vicarious liability in punitive
damages, the Court stated that Congress had formulated the Civil Rights Act of
1991 in such a way as to leave intact the limits on employer liability that were
established in Meritor.200 Recognizing that jurisdictions had advanced
different views with respect to this issue, the majority said it would look to the
general common law of agency, as opposed to any individual state’s law.201

punitive damages when an employee meets the requirements of subsection (c) and engages in an
action that results in tangible employment consequences. United States Supreme Court Official
Transcript, Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (No. 98-208), 1999 WL 130627.
196. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 540.
197. Id.
198. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 541.
Nearly a century before Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, differing views
regarding the propriety of holding principals liable in punitive damages for the acts of servants
had divided American courts into two opposing camps. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, LAW OF
DAMAGES § 80, at 282-83 (1935). On one side was the view that personal fault should exist in
cases seeking to impose liability in punitive damages. Id. Those opposing the imposition of
punitive damages on employers for the unauthorized acts of their agents believed that so far as the
idea of punishment included the purposes of “vengeance or retribution,” there would be little
justification for punishing the master for the willful or wanton conduct of the agent. Id. In the
opposing camp were those advocating the doctrine of legal equivalence, which imputes liability
for the acts of the agent to the master as a means of deterrence. Id. at 284. Ultimately, those courts
opposing liability formulated a rule that punitive damages may not be assessed against a principal
for the acts of his subordinate agent, unless the principal has participated in or ratified the
“subordinate” agent’s wrongdoing. This rule was adopted by the Supreme Court in Lake Shore &
M.S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 107 (1893).
199. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 541-42.
200. Id. at 542. In Meritor, the Court found that employers would not always be held “strictly
liable” for acts of sexual harassment by supervisors. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 77. See discussion supra
Part III.A.
201. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 542. For many years, the prevailing view among the states has been
that an employer who is liable for actual damages may also be liable for punitive damages. In
other words, if an employee commits a malicious act while acting within the scope of
employment then punitive damages may be imputed. 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES § 4.4(B)(2)(a), at 179 (3d. ed. 1995) (noting that the view adopted in the Restatement
of Agency is more conservative). But cf. 2 JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES L & PRAC § 24.02 (1999) (noting that a large number of jurisdictions require more
than proof that an agent was acting within the “course of employment” at the time of the wrongful
act in order to impose vicarious liability).
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The Court looked to the Restatement (Second) of Agency, section 217C,
which strictly limits the circumstances under which an agent’s misconduct may
be imputed to the principal for the purposes of awarding punitive damages.202
Section 217C makes it proper for punitive damages to be awarded against an
employer because of an act by an employee if:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the
scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the
act.203

The majority focused on subsection (c), briefly discussing what it may
mean to work in a “managerial capacity” and what actions may be considered
“in the scope of employment.”204 The Court found “no good definition of what
constitutes a ‘managerial capacity.’”205 It only stated that a fact-intensive
inquiry must be used in determining whether an employee meets this
description.206 The fact-intensive inquiry should include review of the type of
authority an employee is given and the amount of discretion the employee has
in executing his or her authority.207 Referencing the examples provided in the
Restatement, the Court noted that in order to be acting in “a managerial
capacity,” employees must be “important,” but they do not have to be the “top
management, officers, or directors.”208
As it had one year earlier in Ellerth and Faragher, the Court looked to
sections 228 and 230 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency to gain an
understanding of what conduct is considered to be within the “scope of
employment.”209 These sections provide that even intentional, “specifically
forbidden” torts are within the “scope of employment” if the conduct is “the
kind [the employee] is employed to perform,” “occurs substantially within the
authorized time and space limits,” and “is actuated, at least in part, by a

202. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 542-43.
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1958).
204. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 543.
205. Id. (citing 2 GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 201, § 24.05, at 14).
206. Id. (citing 1 SCHLUETER, supra note 201, § 4.4(B)(2)(a), at 182).
207. Id. at 543.
208. Id. at 543 (citing 2 GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 201, § 24.05, at 14). The cases
discussed in the referenced portion found employees to be working in a “managerial capacity”
based on such factors as (1) possession of supervisory or decision-making authority and (2)
responsibility for running a business or department. 2 GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 201, §
24.05, at 14-15. The title conferred on an agent, however, is not important to this analysis. Id.
209. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 543-44.
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purpose to serve” the employer.210 The majority found that a strict application
of these “scope of employment” principles would conflict with the principle
that it is “improper . . . to award punitive damages against one who himself is
personally innocent and therefore liable only vicariously.”211 Furthermore, the
Court feared that the application of the Restatement’s scope of employment
rule would deter employers from taking a proactive approach to the prevention
of sexual harassment.212 It would generate concern that the “malice” or
“reckless indifference” standard in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a penalized employers
who educated themselves and their employees on Title VII prohibitions.213
The Court found this would be contrary to Title VII’s underlying purposes.214
The majority cited its 1998 decision in Faragher for the proposition that Title
VII’s prophylactic goal is to avoid harm, not to provide redress.215 Similarly,
the Court cited its 1998 decision in Ellerth for the idea that “Title VII is
designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment policies and effective
grievance mechanisms.”216 As urged by Circuit Judge Tatel in the en banc
dissent, the Court concluded that the “good-faith efforts” taken by employers
to prevent discrimination should be viewed as evidence of the fact that they
had not acted with a “reckless” or “malicious” state of mind.217
With these concerns in mind, the majority adopted a modified meaning of
what it means to be acting within the “scope of employment,” and formulated a
new rule for holding employers vicariously liable in punitive damages.218 The
majority held, “[A]n employer may not be vicariously liable for the
discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where these
decisions are contrary to the employer’s ‘good-faith efforts to comply with
Title VII.’”219 The goal behind this rule is to “motivat[e] employers to detect
and deter Title VII violations.”220 The Court remanded the case for a
determination of whether Kolstad could identify facts sufficient to support an
inference that the requisite mental state could be imputed to the ADA.221
210. Id. at 543 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228(1), 230 cmt. b (1958)).
211. Id. at 544 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 cmt. b (1979)).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 544-45; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory
Council in Support of Respondent, Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999), No. 98208, 1999 WL 21283 (“[I]f an employer had made efforts to familiarize itself with Title VII’s
requirements, then any violation of those requirements by the employer can be inferred to have
been committed ‘with malice or with reckless indifference to the law’s requirements.’”).
214. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 544.
218. Id. at 545.
219. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545 (citing Circuit Judge Tatel’s dissent from the en banc opinion).
220. Id. at 546.
221. Id.
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The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions

a.

Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
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Dissenting as to the standard of liability; Concurring as to the standard
for imputing vicarious liability in punitive damages to the employer
Chief Justice Rehnquist issued a separate dissenting opinion with respect
to the first part of the majority opinion, which Justice Thomas joined.222 The
dissent argued that the two-tiered scheme of Title VII monetary liability
indicated that there was an egregiousness requirement that reserved punitive
damages for the worst cases of intentional discrimination.223 However,
because the Court had rejected their interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1),
the Justices joined the second part of the majority opinion, which they viewed
as placing “a significant limitation, and in many foreseeable cases a complete
bar, on employer liability for punitive damages.”224
b.

Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer
Concurring as to the standard of liability; Dissenting as to the standard
for imputing vicarious liability in punitive damages to the employer

Although Justice Stevens joined the first part of the majority’s opinion,
which addressed the standard of liability intended by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, he
also wrote a separate concurrence addressing this issue. Most significant,
however, was Justice Stevens’ dissent with respect to the standard for imputing
vicarious liability in punitive damages to employers. Justices Souter, Ginsburg
and Breyer joined in his concurrence and dissent.
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens noted that the number of Title VII and
ADA violations committed unknowingly should be declining, as the mandates
of the federal laws become ingrained in employers’ minds.225 In light of this
increasing awareness of discrimination laws, he thought it would have been
perverse for Congress to require more than a willful violation of the law to

222. Id. at 547.
223. Id.
224. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 547.
225. Id. at 550.
As more employers come to appreciate the importance and the proportions of those
statutes’ [Title VII & the ADA] mandates, the number of federal violations will continue
to decrease accordingly. But at the same time, one could reasonably believe, as Congress
did, that as our national resolve against employment discrimination hardens, deliberate
violations of Title VII and the ADA become increasingly blameworthy and more properly
the subject of ‘social condemnation’ . . . in the form of punitive damages.
Id.
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trigger the punitive damages remedy for Title VII violations.226 However,
unlike the majority, Justice Stevens applied this “intentional violation” test to
the ADA’s acts of discrimination against Kolstad. He found that the evidence
in the record would have supported a jury decision that the ADA had “willfully
violated” Title VII.227
The supporting evidence included Kolstad’s testimony that the ADA had
taken a “tangible employment action” against her by denying her the job
promotion.228 The record also indicated that Kolstad was the more qualified
candidate for the job and that the ADA’s “decisionmakers” were senior
executives who were known for their sexually offensive jokes and derogatory
treatment of professional women.229 Furthermore, Justice Stevens said, the
record supported inferences that the executives deliberately refused to consider
Kolstad’s application, manipulated the job description, and conducted a “sham
selection procedure.”230 Justice Stevens found there to be no bar on the ADA’s
liability for a number of reasons.231 First, the ADA did not claim that the
decisionmakers violated company policy or were not acting within the scope of
employment, nor did the Association disavow the conduct of its executives.232
In addition, neither the ADA, nor its decisionmakers, claimed ignorance of
Title VII requirements or offered a “‘good-faith reason’ for believing that
being a man was a legitimate requirement for the job.”233
The dissent further criticized the majority’s decision to discuss the
applicability of agency principles in imputing punitive damages liability to
employers.234 Justice Stevens expressed strong disagreement with the Court’s
decision to “volunteer an opinion” on an issue that the parties did not brief and
the facts of the case did not present.235 He stressed that the respondent
“expressly disavowed” the relationship of agency principles to the issue before
the Court.236 Upon questioning during oral argument, the respondent’s counsel
stated twice, “[W]e all agree here . . . that that precise issue is not before the
Court.”237
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 550-51.
Id. at 551.
Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 551.
Id.
Id. at 551-52.
Id. at 552.
Id.
Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 552.
Id.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 552.
Id. at 552.
The petitioner’s counsel, Eric Schnapper, was similarly reluctant to discuss the
application of agency principles during oral argument. Schnapper pointed out that the
consideration of such agency principles was not relevant due to the fact that “the culpable
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Justice Stevens pointed to the fact that the two executives who made the
decision not to promote Kolstad were the executive director of the ADA and
the acting head of the Association’s Washington office.238 He reasoned that
perhaps neither the parties, nor the eleven circuit judges, found the vicarious
liability issue to be relevant because “promotion decisions are quintessential
‘company acts.’”239 Furthermore, the dissent pointed out a weakness in the
majority’s implication that Judge Tatel raised the agency issue in the circuit
court. Justice Stevens noted that Judge Tatel also concluded that the case did
not present circumstances where the vicarious liability arguments would be
relevant.240
The dissent found the majority’s decision to consider an “alternative
defense[] of the judgment under review . . . not presented in the brief in
opposition to the petition for certiorari,” to conflict with the Supreme Court’s
own Rule 15.2, which provides the stipulations for filing a brief in opposition
to a petition for certiorari.241 The dissent also called into doubt the majority’s
reference to the Solicitor General’s oral argument as support for its decision to
address the vicarious liability issue.242 Justice Stevens noted that the Solicitor
General did not brief the agency issue and stated in oral argument that the issue
“is not really presented here.”243 Upon further questioning, the Solicitor
General stated that when a tangible employment consequence has occurred, 42
U.S.C. § 1981a incorporates the “managerial capacity” principles set forth in
the Restatement (Second) of Agency.244 The dissent thus found that because
the majority had “tinkered” with the principles espoused by the Restatement, it
had rejected the Government’s interpretation of its own standard without
giving it an opportunity to be heard.245

officials included the executive director of the defendant, the highest ranking official they had.”
Some members of the Court appeared to disagree, asserting their belief that under normal agency
principles, where a corporation had a nondiscrimination policy in place and an employee violated
that policy, the company would not be punished. Schnapper reminded the Court that the majority
view is that punitive damages are not available against individuals for violations of Title VII.
Therefore, the only avenue of relief is through the employer. United States Supreme Court
Official Transcript, Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (No. 98-208), 1999 WL
130627.
238. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 552-53 (citing Circuit Judge Tatel’s en banc dissent in Kolstad, 139
F.3d at 979).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 553 (citing the D.C. Circuit’s panel decision in Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1439).
241. Id. at 553.
242. Id. at 553.
243. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 553; see also discussion of the Solicitor General’s oral argument,
supporting the dissenting opinion, supra note 195.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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D. Application of Kolstad
Following is a discussion of the circuit court decisions that have most
thoroughly discussed and attempted to apply the punitive damages standard set
forth in Kolstad. These interpretations have occurred in cases arising under
both Title VII and the ADA.246
1.

Blackmon v. Pinkerton Security & Investigative Services, 8th Circuit,
June 30, 1999247

Connie Blackmon was employed as a security guard for Pinkerton
Security.248 Her coworkers, an all-male group, constantly used lurid, sexual
language in her presence.249 Blackmon complained repeatedly to her
coworkers and three successive levels of officers, including her shift
supervisor, the supervisor of security personnel, and the district manager.250
Rather than responding to her complaints, the officers retaliated against
Blackmon.251 When she finally took her complaints to the district manager,
246. See also Henderson v. Simmons Foods, Inc., 217 F.3d 612, 619 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding
that the employer exhibited deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s rights when the plaintiff
reported several incidents of verbal abuse and sexual assault to supervisors and the employer
nevertheless placed the plaintiff in close proximity to the harasser and ignored her repeated
requests for transfer); Weissman v. Dawn Joy Fashions, Inc., 214 F.3d 224, 235 (2d Cir. 2000)
(vacating a punitive damages award, where the court found that the employer fired the plaintiff
after his heart attack due to the need to keep up with business and not out of “malice or with
reckless indifference” to federal law); United States v. EEOC, 213 F.3d 600, 610-11 (11th Cir.
2000) (affirming the award of punitive damages to three waitresses who were forced to stop
waiting tables in their fifth month of pregnancy pursuant to a company policy, which certain
managers knew to be in violation of federal law); EEOC v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 214 F.3d
813, 820-22 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the evidence supported a reasonable basis for a jury to
find in favor of the Commission, where the employer received approximately 14 complaints of
sexual harassment against one employee in a 20-year period and nevertheless failed to
appropriately discipline the employee); Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365, 375 (7th Cir.
2000) (vacating the punitive damages award because the employer lacked the culpable state of
mind when it wrongly believed that the plaintiff’s condition was not a disability and therefore
neglected to respond to the plaintiff’s request for a reasonable accommodation under the ADA)
(dissenting judge arguing that the Regional Medical Director, who was responsible for handling
accommodation requests, was aware of the employer’s ADA policy and nevertheless responded
with “callousness” to the plaintiff’s request for an accommodation).
247. Blackmon v. Pinkerton Sec. and Investigative Serv., 182 F.3d 629 (8th Cir. 1999).
248. Id. at 631.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Blackmon, 182 F.3d at 631-34. In response to Blackmon’s complaints about the
demeaning conduct of her coworkers, several officers subjected Blackmon to additional
unacceptable harassment. Id. For example, her shift supervisor told that she was upset because
“she wasn’t getting any sex.” Id. at 631. The supervisor of all security personnel at her site told
Blackmon he “did not promote women on his account, he got rid of them.” Id. The retaliatory acts
taken against the plaintiff are too numerous to set forth fully. On one particular occasion,
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the officials conducted a “sham investigation,” during which they actually
began investigating Blackmon.252 Blackmon was eventually fired for missing
a training session.253 She sued for sexual harassment and retaliation in
violation of Title VII.254 Among other relief, the jury awarded her $100,000 in
punitive damages.255 The district court withdrew the punitive damages
award.256
On appeal, Circuit Judge McMillian remanded for reinstatement of
punitive damages.257 The court found that the company had acted with malice
and reckless indifference to Blackmon’s Title VII rights when it: (1) failed to
investigate and attempt to promptly remedy her grievances, even after she had
complained to three levels of supervisors; (2) repeatedly retaliated against her
by reprimanding and demoting her, fostering a hostile environment, and
ultimately firing her; (3) conducted a sham investigation during which it
solicited information against her; and (4) tried to escape liability for retaliating
against her by firing another worker simultaneously.258 The court also noted
that at least two of Blackmon’s supervisors were active participants in the
harassment.259 Judge McMillian concluded that the actions taken by the
respondent to address Blackmon’s concerns were “clearly inadequate” and
“disproportionate” to the seriousness of the employee’s complaints.260
2.

EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 10th Circuit, Aug. 23, 1999261

Wal-Mart hired Eduardo Amaro knowing he was hearing-impaired and
would require the aid of an interpreter to fulfill certain job functions.262 In
Blackmon was reprimanded by her shift supervisor for not completing certain job tasks that her
male coworkers had also failed to complete without criticism. Id. In addition, the supervisor of
security personnel demoted Blackmon after she missed a day of work due to a migraine headache.
Blackmon, 182 F.3d at 632. Blackmon had tried to contact the supervisor according to company
policy, but was unable to reach him. Id. As a last resort, she had left a message with another
supervisor. Id.
252. Blackmon, 182 F.3d at 633.
253. Id. at 634. In order to protect Pinkerton Security from liability, the district manager and
supervisor also fired a male employee who had missed the meeting. Id.
254. Id. at 635.
255. Id. at 635.
256. Blackmon, 182 F.3d at 635.
257. Id. at 637.
258. Blackmon, 182 F.3d at 636. The court noted that it is not always improper to include
information about the complaining employee in the investigation, and said that such information
can be helpful in even an even-handed, good-faith investigation. Id. The problem here was that
this investigation consisted almost exclusively of gathering unfavorable information about the
plaintiff. Id.
259. Blackmon, 182 F.3d at 636.
260. Id. at 637.
261. EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1999).
262. Id. at 1243.
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1993, Amaro refused to attend a mandatory training session where neither
closed-captioning nor an interpreter was available to help him understand a
video presentation.263 After this incident, Amaro was demoted.264 The store
manager provided two reasons for this “job transfer,” including (1) payroll cuts
and (2) the belief that a maintenance job would involve “less communications”
and would be “more simple” for Amaro.265 Amaro was temporarily suspended
when he requested that an interpreter explain the job transfer to him.266 When
the store manager did provide an interpreter one week later, it was in a meeting
held to fire Amaro.267 Amaro intervened in a suit filed by the EEOC and was
awarded $75,000 in punitive damages in addition to other remedies.268
Wal-Mart appealed the award of punitive damages in light of Kolstad.269
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the award.270 The court
found the store supervisor’s testimony that he was familiar with the
accommodation requirements of the ADA to support a conclusion that WalMart intentionally discriminated in the face of a perceived risk that its action
would violate federal law.271 The court next found that, based on the amount
of authority the assistant manager and store supervisor had over certain
personnel matters, both were “managerial agents.”272 By their own admission,
both of these employees had the ability to influence suspension, hiring and
firing decisions.273 Based on this authority, the court also found the employees
to have been acting within the scope of their authority when they suspended
and then terminated Amaro.274 The court then addressed the “good-faith
efforts” defense raised by Wal-Mart.275 Although Wal-Mart had a written
policy about discrimination, the court found the company had not educated its
employees about the requirements of the ADA.276 The assistant manager who
originally reprimanded Amaro testified that she had received no training with

263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1244.
266. Wal-Mart, 187 F.3d at 1244.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Wal-Mart, 187 F.3d at 1244. Wal-Mart argued that (1) the evidence was insufficient to
support a finding that the suspension and termination were in willful disregard of Amaro’s rights;
(2) the supervisors who were responsible for the discriminatory conduct did not exercise
sufficient corporate control to be agents; and (3) even if the supervisors were managerial agents,
their conduct was contrary to company policy. Id.
270. Wal-Mart, 187 F.3d at 1249.
271. Id. at 1246.
272. Id. at 1247.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1248.
275. Wal-Mart, 187 F.3d at 1248.
276. Id. at 1249.
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respect to reasonable accommodations required under the ADA until years
after the incident.277 In addition, the personnel manager testified that she had
never received training with respect to employment discrimination, did not
have a copy of the ADA handbook, and had never discussed the ADA with any
employees.278 Finding a “broad failure” on the part of Wal-Mart to educate its
employees, the court upheld the punitive damages award.279
3.

Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 5th Circuit, Aug. 31,
1999280

Julie Deffenbaugh, a white female sales associate of the Wal-Mart
Hypermart in Arlington, Texas, began dating Truce Williams, a black WalMart sales associate, in 1992.281 After the store manager saw Deffenbaugh and
Williams together, he invited Deffenbaugh to a meeting, in which she was told
that she “would never move up with the company being associated with a
black man.”282 This comment was made in the presence of the store manager
and Deffenbaugh’s then-current supervisor.283 Deffenbaugh’s performance
evaluations had been favorable up to that point, but subsequently her
supervisor accused her of “shopping on the clock.”284 Believing the reprimand
to be pretextual, Deffenbaugh complained to the regional manager.285 On
January 14, 1994, the day after Deffenbaugh married Williams, she was
terminated by her direct supervisor after being accused again of shopping
during work hours.286 In fact, it was Williams who had made a purchase using
Deffenbaugh’s discount card, but he was not working at the time.287
Deffenbaugh sued Wal-Mart alleging that she had been discriminated against
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.; see also Julie Brienza, News & Trends: Wal-Mart Found Vicariously Liable in ADA
Case, 35 TRIAL 96 (Nov. 1999) (quoting appellate attorney for the EEOC who argued the case
before the Tenth Circuit) (“Good-faith isn’t promulgating a manual and then putting it on a shelf
so it will get dusty . . . . We just hope it’s [the decision] . . . going to clear things up in the future,
and we won’t have to deal with these arguments about who can impute liability and who cannot.
Simply taking some prophylactic measures like promulgating a manual is not enough. You really
have to train the employees.”).
280. Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 188 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 1999).
281. Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 585 (5th Cir. 1998),
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated sub nom Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 169 F.3d 215
(5th Cir. 1999), and opinion reinstated on reh’g, 182 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999), and opinion
vacated, 188 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (reinstating the jury verdict awarding
punitive damages in light of Supreme Court’s decision in Kolstad).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Deffenbaugh-Williams, 156 F.3d at 585.
287. Id. at 586.
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for her decision to date and marry a black man.288 A jury awarded her
$100,000 in punitive damages.289 The district court subsequently granted WalMart’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the punitive damages
issue.290
Both parties appealed, and in light of the Supreme Court’s June 1998
decisions in Faragher and Ellerth, the Fifth Circuit upheld liability and
reinstated the punitive damages award, ordering remittitur to $75,000.291
Shortly after the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Kolstad, the Fifth
Circuit granted rehearing.292 After Kolstad was decided, the en banc court
reinstated the panel opinion, except as to punitive damages, and remanded to
the panel to consider the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision.293 In this
case, the Fifth Circuit determined that remand was unnecessary, and further
found that, in light of Kolstad, judgment as a matter of law should not have
been granted to Wal-Mart.294 The Fifth Circuit determined that the district
court had erred in finding that only the regional manager was “sufficiently high
in the Wal-Mart hierarchy” to impute the actions to the employer.295 The court
found that Deffenbaugh’s immediate supervisor, who had the authority to
terminate her and was in charge of departments at six stores, was also a
“managerial agent.”296 The court did not disturb its en banc decision that the
supervisor’s pretextual reprimands, which began after he learned of
Deffenbaugh’s interracial relationship, were motivated by malice or reckless
disregard of her rights to engage in such a relationship.297 The Fifth Circuit
concluded by finding evidence that Wal-Mart encouraged employees to contact
upper management with problems to be insufficient to prove that the employer
had made “good-faith efforts” to comply with Title VII.298 The court noted
that Wal-Mart did not present evidence that it had responded to the employee’s
complaint.299 In addition, Wal-Mart did not explain why one manager’s
statement on corporate disapproval of interracial dating went uncorrected by
the other two managers present at the meeting.300 The court remanded for
reinstatement of punitive damages in the amount of $75,000.301
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id.
Deffenbaugh-Williams, 188 F.3d at 281.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Deffenbaugh-Williams, 188 F.3d at 286.
Id. at 285.
Id.
Id. at 286.
Id.
Deffenbaugh-Williams, 188 F.3d at 286.
Id.
Id.
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Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 8th Circuit, June 6, 2000302

As the sales manager for a Disk Jockey store in Sioux City, Iowa, Kerry
Ogden reported directly to the district manager, Robert Hudson.303 One of
Hudson’s job duties was the completion of sales manager evaluations, which
were used for the purpose of awarding annual raises.304 Ogden alleged that she
was sexually harassed by Hudson, from June 1994 until September 1995.305
Specifically, she presented evidence that Hudson had made three physical
advances toward her, in addition to incessant propositions to accompany him
Coworkers corroborated Ogden’s
on various romantic excursions.306
testimony that her rejection of Hudson’s sexual advances resulted in
mistreatment in the form of constant criticism, verbal berating, and refusal to
complete an evaluation in 1995 so that she could receive her annual raise.307
In August 1995, the plaintiff reported to the regional manager that Hudson
had threatened her for refusing his advances.308 The regional manager
dismissed the Plaintiff’s complaint as a “personality conflict,” and
subsequently investigated the Plaintiff’s conduct, rather than that of Hudson.309
After the investigation, Ogden was told that she could not continue working for
Hudson.310 Prior to her departure in September 1995, Ogden placed two calls
to a vice president of the corporation regarding her complaints.311 Neither call
was returned. A jury awarded Ogden $260,000 in punitive damages and the
district court denied the employer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.312
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the
evidence supported the punitive damages award.313 The court noted that, based
on the record, a reasonable jury could have found the district manager’s
conduct to be “sufficiently abusive” so as to manifest “malice or reckless
disregard” for the plaintiff’s rights.314 Furthermore, Hudson testified that he
302. Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2000).
303. Id. at 1003.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Ogden, 214 F.3d at 1003.
308. Id. at 1004.
309. Id. at 1004-05.
310. Id. at 1005.
311. Id.
312. Ogden, 214 F.3d at 1002. The jury also awarded Ogden compensatory damages, and preand post-termination back pay. Id.
313. Id. at 1009.
314. Id. at 1009-10. It is meaningful to note that in this case, the court applied the standard of
liability set forth in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to the harasser rather than to the employer. As
discussed supra in Part IV.B, the 1991 Act provides that punitive damages may be recovered if
the “complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice . . .
with malice or with reckless indifference to . . . federally protected rights.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1)
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not only was familiar with the company’s sexual harassment policy, but he had
also received “extensive training on sexual harassment issues.”315 The court
therefore concluded that a jury could reasonably find that Hudson had “acted
in the face of a perceived risk that his actions would violate federal law.”316
With respect to the employer’s vicarious liability, the court found that
there was “substantial evidence” that Hudson was serving in a “managerial
capacity and acted within the scope of his employ[ment].”317 In support of its
conclusion that Hudson was acting within the scope of his authority when he
harassed Ogden, the court noted that he was responsible for setting the
schedules and conducting performance evaluations for employees in several
stores.318 Furthermore, the court noted that the conduct was performed at least
partially to serve the employer.319 The court rejected the employer’s argument
that its sexual harassment policy and custom of encouraging employees to
contact the home office with grievances was sufficient evidence that it had
made “good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.”320 Rather, the court
emphasized the fact that the company “minimized” the plaintiff’s complaints,
performed a sham investigation that focused on the victim rather than the
harasser, and forced the plaintiff to resign, while taking no disciplinary action
toward the defendant.321
V. ANALYSIS
In the aftermath of Kolstad, the Supreme Court’s discussion of the
circumstances under which discriminatory managerial acts will be imputed to
employers for the purpose of awarding punitive damages has been criticized
for its lack of guidance and clarity. Evaluating the Court’s discussion of
agency principles, one practitioner has said, “This part of the opinion really
raises more questions than it answers. The Court went off on an adventure of
its own and came up with the vicarious liability part. It’s shameful in a way

(emphasis added). In Kolstad, the Supreme Court interpreted this language as meaning that the
“employer must at least discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate
federal law.” Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536 (emphasis added). Therefore, while the outcome would
have undoubtedly been the same if the court had looked to the employer’s state of mind, the
decision is arguably analytically flawed.
315. Ogden, 214 F.3d at 1010.
316. Id.
317. Id. (noting that Hudson’s abusive conduct commonly occurred during working hours and
on the employer’s premises).
318. Id. (noting that by withholding performance evaluations, Hudson had the ability to deny
raises).
319. Id.
320. Ogden, 214 F.3d at 1010.
321. Id.
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because the Supreme Court was not really properly educated on this issue.”322
Other practitioners have expressed similar views. One commented,
“[A]lthough the Court removed one bright-line objective screen against
punitive damages, it added additional filters without explaining the details of
their application.”323 Another said, “[T]he result of the Supreme Court’s
precipitous ruling is a decision analytically flawed and inconsistent with its
own precedent.”324
A.

Vicarious Liability—An Issue Not Before the Court

The above criticisms are in line with the views of the dissenting Justices
who criticized the majority’s choice to address an issue that was neither briefed
to the Court, nor relevant to the factual situation at hand.325 The official
transcript clearly indicates that both parties and the Solicitor General believed
the vicarious liability issue to be irrelevant because the discriminatory conduct
was committed by the two top-ranking officers of the ADA.326 In other words,
neither a lower-level manager, nor a mid-level supervisory agent had violated
the plaintiff’s Title VII rights. To understand this position, it is helpful to look
back to the period following the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Meritor.
After Meritor, commentators distinguished the discriminatory acts of
supervisors from acts committed by certain managers and high-level
officials.327 The view was that top managers and high-level officials would
exercise sufficient authority that their actions necessarily could be
In this environment, an
characterized as acts of the “employer.”328
examination of agency principles was not necessary.329 This concept was
extensively discussed in Faragher as the “proxy” theory.330 In addition, in
both Faragher and Ellerth, the Court found nothing “remarkable” about the
fact that employers had been routinely held liable for discriminatory
322. Julie Brienza, Supreme Court Makes Punitive Damages for Job Bias Harder to Get, 35
TRIAL 16 (Sept. 1999) (quoting Jeffrey Needle, Chair of the Employment Rights Section of the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ALTA), who also prepared the amicus brief submitted
to the Supreme Court on behalf of the ALTA).
323. Donald M. Falk, In Focus: Supreme Court Review, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 16, 1999, at B9.
324. John A. Beranbaum, Supreme Court Establishes New Defense to Punitive Damages
Claims, 7 No. 6 EMPLOYMENT L. STRATEGIST 1 (Oct. 1999).
325. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 553; see also discussion of the dissenting opinion supra Part
IV.C.3.b.
326. See discussion of statements made during Oral Argument by Solicitor General supra
note 195; discussion of statements made during Oral Argument by petitioner’s attorney supra
note 237; discussion of the Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion supra Part IV.C.3.b.
327. MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 254 (1988).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789-90; see also discussion of the “proxy theory” supra Part
III.B.2.
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employment actions by supervisors in such quintessential company acts as
firing, withholding promotions and assigning unfavorable job tasks.331 In
Faragher, the Court said when such tangible employment actions are taken,
the supervisor “merges” with the employer.332 In Ellerth, the Court said it is
through these acts that supervisors bring “the official power of the enterprise to
bear on subordinates.”333
While neither Meritor, nor the 1998 companion cases, involved a punitive
damages claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, the idea that employers
should be held liable for the intentional wrongs of certain high-level officials
was advanced more than a century ago in Lake Shore & Michigan Southern
Railway Co. v. Prentice.334 In Lake Shore, the Supreme Court formulated its
first rule for imputing the intent of subordinate agents to employers for the
purpose of holding corporations liable in punitive damages.335 Although the
Court limited the circumstances in which a subordinate agent’s intent would be
imputed to the employer, it noted that a different rule would apply where a topranking officer committed the intentional tort.336 The Court stated,
The president and general manager, or, . . . vice president in his place,
actually wielding the whole executive power of the corporation, may well be
treated as so far representing the corporation and identified with it that any
wanton, malicious, or oppressive intent of his . . . may be treated as the intent
of the corporation itself.337

Thus, Lake Shore supports the idea that the “proxy” or “alter ego” theories of
liability discussed in Faragher and Ellerth should also apply in the punitive
damages context.
Applying these ideas to Kolstad, the two individuals who violated Title VII
through their discriminatory actions were the top two executives of the ADA.
If the Supreme Court had followed precedent, it would have concluded that the
discriminatory intent of these two high-ranking officers was to be treated as
that of the ADA, without regard to a discussion of vicarious liability principles.
Even Circuit Judge Tatel, whose en banc dissent is relied upon by the majority,
noted that if the person discriminating is “the employer’s entire decisionmaking apparatus,” there is no difference between the employer’s awareness of
its legal obligations and the employee’s awareness.338 Furthermore, according
to the Court’s decisions in Faragher and Ellerth, the two officers were
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
IV.C.1.

See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
147 U.S. 101, 114 (1893). See discussion of Lake Shore supra note 198.
Lake Shore, 147 U.S. at 107.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 974; see also discussion of Tatel’s en banc dissent supra Part
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engaging in a quintessential corporate act—a promotion decision. Therefore,
regardless of the officers’ rank in the ADA’s hierarchy, their decision not to
promote Kolstad would have made the ADA strictly liable. This analysis
supports the unanimous view of the petitioner, respondent and Solicitor
General that the vicarious liability issue was not before the Supreme Court.
B.

A Comparison of Vicarious Liability Standards

In all respects, the policies underlying the Kolstad decision are the same as
those underlying the Court’s 1998 decisions in Faragher and Ellerth.339 The
vicarious liability standards set forth in each of these cases were designed to
encourage forethought and planning on the part of employers. So important
were these policy goals, that in each case, the Supreme Court disregarded Title
VII’s statutory language and created an affirmative defense to aid employers in
escaping liability.340 The Court purported to base its decisions on agency
principles, but in each case the Court modified the language in the Restatement
(Second) of Agency to advance these underlying policy goals.341 For example,
in Ellerth, the Court determined that employers would not be vicariously liable
when supervisors sexually harassed subordinates under the section 219(1),
which extends liability for torts committed in the “scope of employment.”342
Although the Restatement provides that even specifically forbidden acts may
be within the scope of an agent’s employment, the Court rejected the idea that
acts of sexual discrimination fit into this category. Instead, the Court found an
alternative method for finding employers liable under the aided-in-the-agencyrelation theory in section 219(2)(d). The Court modified this principle to
provide an affirmative defense when no tangible employment action has been
taken.343 When the Court decided Kolstad, just one year later, it was again
faced with the “scope of employment” language in section 217C(c).344 Again,
the Court found that the “scope of employment” rules would reduce the
incentive for employers to implement antidiscrimination provisions. The
Court thus modified these principles creating a “good-faith efforts” defense for
employers.”345

339. See discussion of policy goals in Faragher & Ellerth supra Part III.B.1-2. See majority’s
discussion of policy goals in Kolstad supra Part IV.C.2.b.
340. See discussion supra Part IV.C.2.b (explaining the “good-faith efforts” defense set forth
in Kolstad); see also discussion supra Part III.B.1-2 (explaining the “reasonable care defense” set
forth in Ellerth and Faragher).
341. See discussion of Supreme Court’s modification of agency principles in Kolstad supra
Part IV.C.2.b; see also discussion of Supreme Court’s modification of agency principles in
Ellerth and Faragher supra Part III.B.1-2.
342. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756-57; see also discussion of Ellerth supra in Part III.B.1.
343. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
344. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 543-44; see also discussion of Kolstad supra Part IV.C.2.b.
345. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544.
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Unfortunately, in the Court’s attempts to maximize its policy goals, it
failed to tie together the 1998 and 1999 decisions, thereby overlooking some
inconsistencies. The first inconsistency arose from the Court’s varied
interpretations of the “scope of employment” language in section 228 of
Restatement (Second) of Agency. As discussed above, in Ellerth and
Faragher, the Court adopted the general rule that sexual harassment by a
supervisor is not conduct within the “scope of employment.” In doing so, the
court reasoned that sex discrimination was the result of one’s own “genderbased animus” or “sexual urges” and was a “detour” from the ordinary course
of employment.346 However, in Kolstad, the Court “modified” the “scope of
employment” principles only to provide that employers will not be liable for
discriminatory acts by managerial agents if they are using “good-faith efforts”
toward Title VII compliance.347
In applying the Kolstad punitive damages standard, the lower courts have
first determined whether the discriminating employee is working in a
managerial capacity. The courts have then looked to whether the employee
was executing responsibilities within the scope of his or her job description.348
If these conditions are met, the courts have next considered the employer’s
“good-faith efforts” defense. For example, in Deffenbaugh-Williams, the store
manager and direct supervisor engaged in discriminatory conduct motivated by
their own bias toward interracial dating. Nevertheless, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found these employees to be acting within the
scope of their authority.349 The court then considered and rejected the
employer’s “good-faith efforts” defense.350 A test that yields this result seems
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s determination in Ellerth and Faragher
that harassment motivated by one’s own “bias” does not fall within the “scope
of employment.”
The Court’s next oversight in Kolstad was its failure to explain how the
key concepts in its 1998 decisions might affect vicarious liability in punitive
damages. For example, in Faragher and Ellerth, the Court’s decision as to
when an employer would be held liable for the harassing acts of its
supervisors, turned on the determination of whether the subordinate employee
had experienced a “tangible employment action,” i.e. hiring, firing or failing to
promote.351 Both of these cases involved plaintiffs who had experienced
346. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756-57; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799; see also discussion of supra Part
III.B.1-2.
347. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544; see also discussion of Kolstad supra Part IV.C.2.b.
348. See, e.g., Wal-Mart, 187 F.3d at 1248; Deffenbaugh-Williams, 188 F.3d at 285-86; see
also discussion of cases supra Part IV.D.
349. Deffenbaugh-Williams, 188 F.3d at 285-86; see also discussion of cases supra Part IV.D.
350. Deffenbaugh-Williams, 188 F.3d at 286.
351. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761; see also discussion of “tangible employment actions” or
“tangible job detriments” supra Part III.B.1-2.
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harassment, which they construed as threats to deny tangible job benefits. On
the other hand, Kolstad involved a plaintiff who had experienced a “tangible
employment action”—the withholding of a promotion—based on her sex.
Nevertheless, the Justice Stevens was the only party who even gave lip service
to this key phrase.352 The Supreme Court’s position, therefore, appears to be
that employers will not be liable in punitive damages for any discriminatory
acts, including tangible employment actions, as long as they have made goodfaith efforts toward Title VII compliance.
This conclusion is problematic for two reasons. First, it directly conflicts
with the position expressed in Faragher and Ellerth, that that these particular
acts of discrimination become the acts of the employer. Second, because the
Court failed to address this issue, the “good-faith efforts” defense has routinely
failed in cases where managerial agents discriminated by firing subordinates (a
tangible employment action).353 These cases indicate that the lower courts are
scrutinizing the employers’ “good-faith efforts” more closely in cases when
such efforts are insufficient to stop “tangible employment actions” from
occurring.
The final weak link between the 1998 decisions and the Kolstad decision
results from the Court’s use of different language to define the affirmative
defenses. In Ellerth and Faragher, the Court set forth a “reasonable care
defense,” while in Kolstad, the Court created a “good-faith efforts” defense.
Because these defenses are likely to be applied very similarly, it would have
been prudent for the Court to use the same terminology and definition in order
to avoid confusing the lower courts.
C. Inadequacies of the Kolstad Punitive Damages Standard
In light of the Court’s decision to authorize punitive damages when an
employer has “discriminate[d] in the face of a perceived risk that its actions
will violate federal law,” it makes no sense for the Court to have set forth a
separate standard for imposing vicarious liability. It is even more difficult to
understand that the Court established a different standard than that set forth in
Faragher and Ellerth and completely failed to give meaning to the new
standard. As discussed in Part IV, the Kolstad majority left several key terms
undefined. The Court gave very vague guidance as to what it means to act in a
“managerial capacity,” and as to what types of employer activities will
Further
constitute “good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.”354

352. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 551 (weighing the evidence against the ADA, and noting that that
Kolstad had alleged a that the ADA had taken a tangible employment action against her); see also
discussion of Justice Stevens’ dissent supra Part IV.C.3.b.
353. See cases discussed supra Part IV.D.1-4.
354. See discussion of “managerial capacity” and “good-faith efforts” defense supra Part
IV.C.2.b.
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complicating the situation, was the fact that after setting forth the new standard
for imputing liability in punitive damages, the Court opted not to apply it to the
case. Perhaps this was in response to the dissent’s adamant stance opposing
addressing the issue at all. On the other hand, perhaps the majority itself did
not want to attempt to apply the ambiguous standard it was setting forth.
Only two vague guidelines were provided to assist the courts in
determining who will be found to be acting in a “managerial capacity.”355
Furthermore, the Court’s statement that there was “no good definition of what
constitutes ‘managerial capacity,’” is ironic, considering the fact that the Court
was formulating a new standard that was inconsistent with the Restatement of
Agency view and not mentioned at all by Congress in § 1981a of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. Considering the leap the Court was already taking, it
could have formulated a definition for this ambiguous term to assist the lower
courts in applying the vicarious liability standard. The cases applying Kolstad
have found a variety of managers and supervisors, including: district managers,
store managers and immediate supervisors, to be acting in a “managerial
capacity.” In making these decisions, the courts have looked to (1) the
employee’s authority over certain personnel matters, including suspension,
hiring and firing decisions, and (2) the employee’s responsibility in running
various departments or business outlets.356
An equally high hurdle for the lower courts to overcome will be
determining what constitutes “good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.”
Basically, the only “good-faith efforts” discussed by the majority was the
adoption of nondiscrimination policies and education of employees on these
policies. In his en banc dissent, Circuit Judge Tatel discussed additional
“good-faith” measures including: (1) hiring staff managers sensitive to Title
VII responsibilities; (2) requiring EEOC training; and (3) using objective
hiring and promotion standards.357 The first place employers should look for
additional instruction is to a set of guidelines issued by the EEOC on June 18,
1999, titled “Enforcement Guidelines: Vicarious Employer Liability for
Unlawful Harassment.”358 These guidelines were designed to clarify the
affirmative defense set forth in Faragher and Ellerth.359 The guidelines state
that employers should establish, distribute to all employees, and enforce a
written policy prohibiting harassment and setting out a procedure for making
355. See discussion of these guidelines supra Part IV.C.2.b.
356. See Wal-Mart,187 F.3d at 1247; Deffenbaugh-Williams, 188 F.3d at 278; see also
discussion of cases supra Part IV.D.
357. Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 974; see also discussion supra note 174.
358. Enforcement Guidelines: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment, No.
915.002 (visited August 27, 2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/harassment.html>.
359. Id.; see also Lang Rutkowski, The Stakes Just Went Up: You Need a Complete
Harassment Policy that is Vigorously Enforced, 14 No. 7 EMPLOYMENT L. UPDATE 1 (July
1999).
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complaints.360
The following elements should be included in an
antidiscrimination policy: (1) a clear explanation of the prohibited conduct; (2)
assurance that employees who make complaints or provide information will
not suffer retaliation as a result; (3) a clearly explained complaint procedure
with accessible avenues; (4) a complaint procedure that provides a prompt,
thorough and impartial investigation; (5) assurance that employers will take
immediate corrective action upon determining that harassment has occurred;
and (6) confidentiality.361 Because the Supreme Court perceived its decision in
Kolstad to be consistent with its Faragher and Ellerth decisions, these EEOC
Guidelines should be helpful to employers in formulating their “good-faith
efforts” defenses as well. Another place employers may wish to look is to a
report issued by the EEOC in 1998.362 The Report sets forth the “best
practices” employed in order to achieve equal employment opportunity in the
workplace.363 These practice guidelines address such areas as: recruitment and
hiring; promotion and career advancement; terms and conditions of
employment and termination of employment.364
VI. CONCLUSION
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court started out on the right track with its
Kolstad decision. It carefully scrutinized the precise language in 42 U.S.C. §
1981a of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, clarifying that Congress intended a
higher burden of proof for the imposition of punitive damages than for liability
in compensatory damages. Furthermore, the Court properly concluded that
this higher burden of proof focused not on additional evidence of egregious
conduct, but rather on knowledge that particular acts violate an employee’s
federally protected rights. It was at this point that the majority should have
followed the view expressed by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion.
Justice Stevens applied the majority’s interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981a and
determined that there was sufficient evidence to remand to the trial court for a
determination of punitive damages liability.
Instead, a 5-4 majority dove into an analysis of vicarious liability. Unlike
the threshold issue in the case, the vicarious liability issue was not briefed to
the Court and was not relevant to the facts of the case at hand. Therefore, the
Court created a standard for imputing punitive damages liability to an
employer in a case where the standard could not be applied. In light of Court’s

360. Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 358.
361. Id.
362. Task Force Report on “Best” Equal Employment Opportunity Policies, Programs and
Practices in the Private Sector (last modified Dec. 22, 1997) <http://www.eeoc.gov/task/
prac2.html>.
363. Id.
364. Id.
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scrutiny of the precise language in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a in the first part of the
majority opinion, its creation of a “good-faith efforts” defense, that was
supported neither by the Restatement (Second) of Agency principles, nor the
statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, was especially imprudent.
Furthermore, the resulting standard makes no sense because if it were
properly applied, courts would first have to find that the employer had acted
with “malice or reckless indifference” to the plaintiff’s rights as required by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Only after making this determination could the
courts consider whether the employer had made “good-faith efforts” to comply
with Title VII. It is impossible to comprehend that an employer who exhibits
“reckless indifference” could simultaneously be making “good-faith efforts” to
comply with federal antidiscrimination laws. Therefore, the lower courts have
been left to grapple with a standard that is more ambiguous than the one with
which they began.
AMY L. BLAISDELL
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